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Workers' Rights, Violence and Impunity 
in Colombia 
January 9,2008 
American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
Preface 
In October 2007, the Colombian government issued a report on labor rights titled 
Colombia: A Progress Report—Strengthening the Rights, Benefits and Security of 
Unions. Unfortunately, that report does not provide an objective and accurate analysis of 
labor rights and labor relations in Colombia. It fails to include serious criticisms by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and ignores the findings of such highly credible human rights organizations as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International. 
This document attempts to complete the picture so policymakers have a better 
understanding of the reality workers face in Colombia. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Crimes Against Trade Unionists 
The National Labor School (ENS) reports that 38 trade unionists were murdered in 
Colombia between January 1 and December 1, 2007. While this does reflect a welcome 
decrease from the number of trade unionists murdered in 2006, the current rate of 
murders still places the country in a class of its own. Since 1991, 2,283 Colombian trade 
unionists have been murdered. In the majority of cases where a motive for the murder 
can be identified, the unionist was murdered because of his or her trade union activity. 
The ENS also registered 201 death threats against trade unionists in the first eleven 
months of 2007. These threats, though not as sensational, severely chill trade union 
activity, particularly because so many of these threats have materialized in the past. The 
combination of ongoing assassinations, death threats and violence against family 
members creates a climate of fear for trade unionists that makes it impossible for them to 
fully and confidently exercise their rights to organize, bargain collectively, go on strike or 
criticize the government. 
Impunity 
The government has established a special sub-unit within the human rights unit of the 
Office of the Attorney General to step up the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
against unionists. While we welcome this new investment of resources, it is not yet 
sufficient to address the enormous backlog of cases. Even with the recent prosecutions, 
the rate of impunity for the murder of trade unionists remains over 97 percent. Also, 
demobilized paramilitary members are eligible for greatly reduced sentences under the 
government's Justice and Peace Program. This means some may serve sentences as short 
as two and a half years, even if convicted of murder. 
Labor Laws 
The ILO has noted repeatedly that several of Colombia's labor laws are not in compliance 
with the ILO core labor standards, which are considered the minimum set of rights to be 
guaranteed by all countries. Further, the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association 
has criticized the government for failing to enforce its own laws or international labor 
standards. Progress on labor law reform has been slow. 
Social Dialogue 
The government asserts it has long maintained social dialogue mechanisms with the 
unions. In some cases, however, mechanisms for dialogue were long dormant and began 
to function again only recently, when external criticism mounted. Colombian unions are 
rightly skeptical about the government's long-term commitment to social dialogue, when 
interest in such dialogue came largely from external pressure. These newly reactivated 
commissions have not yet achieved concrete results in the resolution of longstanding 
conflicts or much-needed improvement in labor law or labor relations. 
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CRIMES, IMPUNITY & PROTECTION 
Murder and Other Crimes 
According to the National Labor School ("Escuela Nacional Sindical," or ENS), a 
frequently cited nongovernmental organization based in Colombia, 2,283 trade unionists 
have been murdered since 1991.' The majority of these men and women were killed 
because of their trade union activity - not as mere bystanders in an internal armed 
conflict. The ENS calculates that 433 of those murders occurred during the 
administration of President Alvaro Uribe.2 Thirty-eight murders took place in the first 
eleven months of 2007.3 The number of trade unionists murdered has fortunately 
decreased from record levels; however, more trade unionists still are killed in Colombia 
every year than in any other country. 
Some analysts of the situation in Colombia attribute the downward trend in murders to 
the changing tactics of illegal armed groups in the last few years, not entirely to 
intervention by the government. The paramilitaries (and their successor organizations), 
which are responsible for most crimes in which the perpetrator has been identified, have 
oriented their activities toward other strategies that have the same impact on the labor 
movement but do not draw the same level of attention from the media and the 
international community. For example, the ENS also registered 201 death threats against 
trade unionists in 2007, as well as 16 cases of armed assault, 14 cases of arbitrary 
detention, 11 disappearances and 95 cases of forced displacement. All these crimes 
severely chill trade union activity, while not showing up in the most-cited homicide 
statistic. In the end, if trade unionists fear for their lives, they will be unable to freely 
exercise their internationally recognized labor rights. 
Regrettably, the government has publicly issued highly inconsistent figures regarding the 
total number of trade unionists murdered in any given year, which calls into question its 
seriousness about ending violence and impunity in the country. Indeed, a cursory review 
of news articles published in major U.S. newspapers revealed four different government 
figures for the total number of trade unionists murdered in 2006. 
Houston Chronicle, June 24, 2007: 58 (citing the government)5 
Miami Herald, July 13, 2007: 25 (citing the government)6 
USA Today, Sept. 25, 2007: 65 (citing President Uribe)7 
' ENS, Informe Sobre Las Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos de Los y Las Sindicalistas Colombianos 
En El Afio 2006 (2007), p.16. 
2
 ENS records reflect 184 murders in 2002, 94 in 2003, 96 in 2004, 70 in 2005 and 72 in 2006. See ENS, 
supra, p. 6. 
3
 See, ENS, Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de los Sindicalistas Colombianos, Enero 1 a Diciembre 1, 
2007, p. 4 
4
 Id. ENS also registered 3,400 death threats between 1991 and 2006. See, ENS, supra n.l at p.16. 
5
 John Otis, Workplace Intimidation, Houston Chronicle, June 24, 2007, p. A21. 
6
 Steven Dudley, Assassins still target unionists, Miami Herald, July 16, 2007, p. Al. 
7
 David Lynch, Colombian Leader Urges Trade Deal OK, Disputes U.S. Killing Claims, USA Today, Sept. 
25, 2007, p. 3B. 
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The New Republic, Dec. 17, 2007: 17 (citing President Uribef 
The Ministry of Social Protection (MSP), the government agency responsible for labor 
policy in Colombia, published a report stating that 60 trade unionists were murdered in 
2006. It appears that the government is either unable or unwilling to settle on the total 
number of trade unionists murdered in 2006. President Uribe's wildly inconsistent 
citations of such an important statistic undermine his attempts to portray his 
administration as deeply committed to addressing the root causes of the violence and the 
impunity. 
Investigations 
To investigate and prosecute crimes against unionists, the government budgeted roughly 
$1 million in 20079 to fund the sub-unit within the Office of the Attorney General 
assigned to address a list of priority cases.10 These funds are necessary for the unit to 
carry out its mission, but the allocation of funds has not yet translated into real results. 
According to government statistics, the Office of the Attorney General (including units 
other than the special sub-unit) secured convictions in 21 cases as of November 20, 2007. 
However, not all of the perpetrators in these cases were tried for or found guilty of 
murder. In the case of Orlando Jose Benitez Palencia, for example, prosecutors were 
unable to establish a motive for the homicide, and the accused were eventually sentenced 
for conspiracy. In another case, that of union leader and former senator Wilson Borja, the 
crime committed was not murder but rather attempted murder. Even with the recent and 
prior prosecutions, the rate of impunity for the murder of trade unionists since 1991 
remains above 97 percent. 
Further efforts to reduce impunity will no doubt be hindered by the lack of information on 
the vast majority of recent cases. According to ENS, the Office of the Attorney General 
only has information on 125 of the 433 murders committed during the Uribe 
Administration. In almost half of the cases on which information is available, 59, a 
potential perpetrator has not even been identified.12 Additional efforts must be made to 
investigate these cases and to collect the evidence necessary to bring them to trial and 
sentencing. 
Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Heavy is the Head, The New Republic, Dec. 19, available online at 
www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=ebb74809-8a68-4067-9692-l8325e2e8e84. 
9
 This figure is from a PowerPoint presentation provided to us by the Office of the Attorney General, Unit 
on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Rights. 
10
 For the Attorney General's Office, the priority list includes 187 select cases and all 2006-2007 cases. 
This is derived from a larger list of 1,194 cases (which include murder, torture, kidnapping and forced 
displacements) that previously were brought to the attention of the ILO by the unions. However, the total 
universe of crimes is much higher. 
" The government claims a total of 67 cases of crimes against trade unionists, including for crimes other 
than murder, that have resulted in a sentence. 
12
 See, CUT, et. al., LABOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN COLOMBIA (Oct. 2007), p. 39. 
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Trials 
In July 2007, the government assigned three judges to adjudicate the more than 1,000 
cases related to crimes against trade unionists that are to be investigated and prosecuted 
by the special sub-unit. In some cases, the judges have undertaken the dangerous work of 
sentencing some of the most notorious paramilitary members in Colombia. 
When a demobilized paramilitary member is found guilty of a crime, the judge's sentence 
often cannot be enforced. Even though the judge may issue a maximum sentence of 40 
years in prison, the paramilitary member may subsequently confess to the crime and serve 
a maximum of only five to eight years under the Justice and Peace Law. In reality, the 
sentence would likely be even lighter. Pursuant to a decree by President Uribe, the 
government is counting 18 months of the time it spent negotiating the demobilization law 
as time served (making the maximum sentence only three and a half to six and a half 
years). Demobilized paramilitaries also are eligible for reductions under ordinary 
detention rules for the time they spend studying and working. This allows their sentences 
to drop by as much as another third (leaving the maximum sentence in some cases only 
two and a half to four and a half years). Further, President Uribe has suggested that once 
the accused are sentenced, they will be moved to ranches to serve out the remainder of 
their terms. 
Currently, only a handful of paramilitary leaders are serving time. Many of those are 
enjoying special privileges (access to the prison by their associates, laptops and cell 
phones, etc). Only about 2,800 of the roughly 31,000 demobilized paramilitaries are 
enrolled under the Justice and Peace Law. The government is seeking to pardon those not 
in the demobilization program, without a full investigation into whether they are 
responsible for any crimes. 
Protection Program 
The protection program for threatened Colombians has received considerable resources, 
from both the Colombian and the U.S. governments. However, the size of the budget is 
no guarantor of its success. Indeed, the operation and effectiveness of the program are 
limited by its inability to accurately assess risk in some cases, to provide suitable 
protection quickly enough to be effective and to adopt and change protection measures 
when that is necessary. In some cases, the unionist has been assigned a protection 
scheme but has waited for months for the protection to actually be provided. In most 
cases, the protection is "soft," meaning the provision of cell phones, walkie-talkies and 
domestic or, occasionally, international transportation. 
The protection program also must be accompanied by serious criminal investigations, 
which certainly would increase the overall level of protection for trade unionists. Such 
investigations are not undertaken with regularity. Further, while there are roughly 1,600 
trade unionists currently in the protection program, the government's labor-relations 
policies and practices tend to undermine the labor movement. Government officials 
continue to make unfounded accusations that trade unionists are guerrillas or guerrilla 
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sympathizers, undercutting unionists' legitimacy. Rather, the government should 
recognize union organizations and their activities as legitimate and publicly denounce 
threats and violence against trade unionists as major obstacles to democracy and rule of 
law in the country. 
The program's linkage to the government's intelligence apparatus also is problematic. 
The case of Jorge Noguera, former head of the government's security department, DAS 
(Departamento Administrative de Seguridad), demonstrates the need to wall off the 
program from the intelligence functions of the state. Noguera was arrested in 2007, 
accused of passing on information about trade unionists under the protection of his 
agency to the paramilitaries.13 Rafael Garcia, the former head of the DAS Information 
Technology and Communications Office, testified in 2006 that the DAS had provided a 
list of trade union leaders to commanders of the paramilitary organization, Northern Bloc 
of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Union members on that list were 
subsequently murdered, under the orders of paramilitary commander "Jorge 40." 
Failed Demobilization 
The government has taken some steps to combat paramilitarism. However, a flawed 
demobilization process has contributed to thousands of former paramilitaries creating 
new and dangerous criminal organizations. The recent reports of the OAS Mission to 
Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) have noted the resurgence of new 
paramilitary groups, some camouflaged as common criminal groups, as well as holdouts 
that have not demobilized. These new groups can be found throughout the country, 
including in Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Narino and the Atlantic Coast.14 Although 
assuming distinct organizational frameworks, many of these groups continue the legacy 
of the paramilitaries, including narcotics trafficking and assassinations, and are 
embedding themselves into the political framework of the country. Indeed, such new 
groups as the "Aguilas Negras" (Black Eagles) are responsible for some of the death 
threats against trade unionists this year. 
In December 2007, three workers at a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Bucaramanga were 
informed that they would be killed and buried in a mass grave by the end of the month if 
they did not cease their protests against their employer. The workers are members of 
SINALTRAINAL, the trade union representing food and beverage workers in Colombia. 
The Aguilas Negras assumed responsibility for this death threat, as well as five other 
against the same union this year. The Aguilas Negras have also issued several specific 
death threats this year against members and the leadership of Union Sindical Obrera 
(USO), which represents workers in the oil industry, and numerous other trade unions in 
Colombia. A copy of a recent death threat from the Aguilas Negras is attached as Annex 
1. 
13
 See, e.g., Simon Romero, "Bush Heads to Colombia as Scandal Taints Alliance," The New York Times, 
March 11,2007. 
4
 International Crisis Group, Colombia's New Armed Groups, May 2007. 
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WORKERS' RIGHTS 
The government's report asserts that "the rights of workers in Colombia are protected by 
law, enshrined in the country's constitution and in practice." However, numerous reports 
from respected international organizations, including the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), reveal a 
very different reality. For years, the ILO has identified several ways in which the labor 
laws of Colombia fail to meet the ILO core labor standards, which are considered a 
minimum set of rights to be guaranteed by all countries regardless of level of 
development. In practice, the record is even worse. 
I. Laws 
A. Freedom of Association15 
Denial or Delay of Union Registration: Under Article 364 of the Labor Code, a new 
union is to have legal status upon its formation. Thereafter, a union need only file a 
specified set of documents with the Ministry of Social Protection (MSP) to complete its 
registration, normally a pro forma process. However, according to Colombian unions, 
the MSP invokes reasons not found within the labor law to deny registration and thus 
arbitrarily delay or deny the recognition of a union. The U.S. State Department found the 
registration of new unions often takes years.16 As a union cannot legally undertake any 
function until it is registered, the government can effectively prevent or indefinitely delay 
workers from representing their interests through a union organization. 
According to a report prepared by the three national union centers, the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (CUT), Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) and the 
Confederacion General de Trabajo (CGT), the MSP also has revoked the registration of 
unions, which is not permitted under the law. Further, the ILO has been clear that 
"cancellation of a trade union's registration should only be possible through judicial 
channels."17 To date, the registration of the following unions has been revoked by the 
administration, not by judicial process: Sintraindu, Antrapro, Atliven, Sintrapananco, 
Sintranalchoc y Sintralacteos.13 
Use of Temporary Contracts, Cooperatives and Temporary Service Companies: Laws 
that allow and encourage the hiring of workers on temporary contracts or indirectly 
through cooperatives and subcontractors are increasingly common in the Andean region. 
• See ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize, Colombia, 2006. 
16
 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-Colombia, March 8, 2006, available 
online at www.state.gov/g/drI/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm. 
17
 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions (2007) (hereinafter "Digest of 
Decisions") 1687. 
18
 CUT, CGT, CTC, CPC, Los Derechos Laborales y las Libertades Sindicales en Colombia, November 
2007, p. 56 at n 64. 
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The effect (and purpose) of these laws has been to negate the workers' right of free 
association and collective bargaining. 
Temporary Contracts: In Colombia, the legal framework for the use of temporary 
contracts is found in Article 3 of Law 50 of 1990, now Article 46 of the Labor Code. 
Under Law 50, employers may hire workers on a temporary basis (up to three years) and 
may continue to renew such contracts indefinitely—often for many years. While such 
workers technically have the right to join unions, when they do, their employers exclude 
them from the workplace by not renewing their contracts when they expire. As a result, 
workers on temporary contracts are extremely fearful and resistant to exercise their right 
to join a union, since they believe (justifiably so) that it will result in dismissal. 
Associated Labor Cooperatives: In theory, a worker cooperative is a voluntary 
association, is democratically self-managed and equitably distributes the gains realized by 
its economic activities to its members. For hundreds of thousands of people working for 
an associated labor cooperative in Colombia, however, the opposite is true. In some 
cases, for example, an employer has required its workers to join an associated labor 
cooperative in order to keep their jobs. In so doing, the employer severs the employment 
relationship and contracts with the cooperative to provide it with the very same workers. 
Even though a cooperative is supposed to be self-managed by the workers, some 
cooperatives are under the effective control of the employer. In still other cases, 
employers have contracted with management-friendly cooperatives that are being 
operated, in practice, as a subcontracting agency. 
Most importantly, those who work for an associated labor cooperative are, under the law, 
treated as owners, not as employees. Thus, these workers are explicitly excluded from 
the application of the labor law.19 This has led to extreme forms of exploitation, 
particularly in the rural sector. The exclusion of these workers from the national labor 
law, in law and in practice, violates ILO Convention 87. The ILO recently explained: 
Mindful of the particular characteristics of cooperatives, the Committee 
considers that associated labor cooperatives (whose members are their 
own bosses) cannot be considered, in law or in fact, as "workers' 
organizations" within the meaning of Convention No. 87, that is 
organizations that have as their objective to promote and defend workers' 
interests. That being so, referring to Article 2 of Convention No. 87 and 
recalling that the concept of worker means not only salaried worker, but 
also independent or autonomous worker, the Committee has considered 
that workers associated in cooperatives should have the right to establish 
and join organizations of their own choosing.20 
Further, the ILO has enjoined its member states to refrain from using cooperatives to 
evade otherwise applicable rights enshrined in the labor code. Article 8(1 )(b) of ILO 
See Law 79 of 1988, Art. 59 and Decree 4588 of 2006, Art. 10. 
Digest of Decisions \ 262. 
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Recommendation 193 (2002) states that "National policies should ... ensure that 
cooperatives are not set up for, or used for, non-compliance with labor law or used to 
establish disguised employment relationships, and combat pseudo cooperatives violating 
workers' rights, by ensuring that labor legislation is applied in all enterprises." 
Recently, several public enterprises—many with active unions—have been privatized, 
including Caja Agraria, Telecom, Bancafe, Inravision and Banestado, among others. As 
these companies are privatized, the successor company does not recognize the union or 
the existing collective bargaining agreement. Rather, workers are dismissed and rehired 
through temporary service agencies, cooperatives or on short-term contracts. 
In 2005, there were 2,980 associated labor cooperatives operating in the public and 
private sectors, with 378,933 associates. The number of cooperatives climbed to 3,296 
in 2006, with 451,869 associates, according to Enrique Valderrama, superintendent for 
Solidarity Economics.23 In his opinion, the official number is too low due to the under-
registration of the cooperatives. 
B. Collective Bargaining24 
Direct Bargaining with Nonunion Employees: Article 481 of the Labor Code, as modified 
by Article 70 of Law 50 of 1990,25 permits collective agreements ("pactos colectivos") to 
be directly negotiated with non-unionized workers where the union represents less than 
one-third of the workforce. In reality, they usually are contracts that workers are unable to 
negotiate and are forced to accept under threat of dismissal. The agreements are used in 
some cases to undermine union representation and collective bargaining by establishing 
terms and conditions with workers often selected and favored by management on the 
condition that they prevent a union presence from growing at the workplace. In some 
cases, the employer will use the promise of an agreement to entice workers to resign from 
the union, leaving membership below the one-third threshold, making such agreements 
legal. 
A Bar to Industry-wide Bargaining: The labor code does not explicitly provide for 
industry-wide collective bargaining, only bargaining at the company level. Although the 
21
 Los Derechos Laborales, supra fn. 4, p. 57. 
22
 Fernando Urrea Giraldo, La Rapida Exapansion de las CTA en Colombia (ENS, 2007). 
23
 El Tiempo, Explosion de Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado (CTA) seprodujo en Colombia el ano 
pasado, Sept. 30, 2007. He also explained that, "There are employers that promote the creation of 
Associated Work Cooperatives and require their workers to affiliate to it." As they are not obligated to 
register their associates under social security, pension and insurance programs, they can provide services at 
much lower rates. 
24
 See ILO, CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, 
Convention 98, Colombia, 2006. 
15
 Article 481 as amended: "The pacts between employers and non-union workers are governed by the 
dispositions established in Titles II and III, Chapter I, Part Second of the Substantive Labor Code, but are 
only applicable to those who have subsequently signed on to them. When the union or unions represent 
more than a third of the workers of a company, the company will not be able to form collective pacts or to 
extend those that are already in effect." 
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level of bargaining is a matter left to the discretion of the parties, the legislation should 
not constitute an obstacle to collective bargaining at the industry level. 26 
Limits on Public-Sector Bargaining: Article 416 of the Labor Code states that public-
sector workers do not have the right to bargain collectively; instead, public-sector 
workers are allowed only to submit "respectful petitions."27 Convention 98, as well as 
Convention 151, explicitly provides that public employees who are not engaged in 
activities involving the administration of the state should enjoy the right to collective 
bargaining.28 
Ban on Collective Negotiation over Pension Benefits: In 2005, Colombia reformed its 
Constitution to eliminate collective bargaining on the subject of pensions. The law also 
provides that the pension provisions of existing collective bargaining agreements will 
become null on July 31, 2010. The ILO has stated that "Matters which might be subject to 
collective bargaining include the type of agreement to be offered to employees or the type 
of industrial instrument to be negotiated in the future, as well as wages, benefits and 
allowances, working time, annual leave, selection criteria in case of redundancy, the 
coverage of the collective agreement, the granting of trade union facilities, including 
access to the workplace beyond what is provided for in legislation etc.; these matters 
should not be excluded from the scope of collective bargaining by law...."29 
Blacklisting: The blacklisting of union leaders by employers is widespread in Colombia. 
The ILO High Level Mission also confirmed the use of blacklisting by the government. 
As the mission report found, "There were some cases of trade unionists being blacklisted 
in some public enterprises in the framework of secret plans to eliminate those trade 
unionists supposed to be members of the guerrilla. These operations were often carried 
out by isolated members of intelligence services, or other similar state agents."30 The 
ILO has stated categorically that, "All practices involving the blacklisting of trade union 
officials or members constitute a serious threat to the free exercise of trade union rights 
and, in general, governments should take stringent measures to combat such practices."31 
26
 Digest of Decisions ffl[ 988-90. 
Article 416: "Unions of public employees cannot present bargaining demands nor celebrate collective 
conventions, but the unions of other official workers have all the attributions of other unions, and their 
bargaining demands will be transacted in same way as the others, even though they cannot declare or 
engage in a strike." The Constitutional Court of Colombia found this law to be unconstitutional. However, 
a new law has yet to be enacted. See Sentence C-1234 of 2005. 
28
 Id. See also, ILO Mission Report (October 2005) H 144. 
29
 Digest of Decisions J 913. 
30
 ILO Mission Report, 1| 77. 
31
 Digest of Decisions, H 803. 
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C. The Right to Strike 
The ability of unions to undertake a strike, an internationally recognized instrument for 
defending or promoting collective rights and interests, is heavily restricted. The ILO has 
held that the Labor Code runs afoul of international norms in the following ways:32 
1. The prohibition on the calling of strikes by federations and confederations.3 The 
ILO has found that "The prohibition on the calling of strikes by federations and 
confederations is not compatible with Convention No. 87."34 
2. The prohibition on strikes, not only in essential services in the strict sense of the 
term, but in a wide range of services that are not essential.35 However, the ILO has found 
that strikes may be restricted or prohibited: (1) in the public service only for public 
servants exercising authority in the name of the State; or (2) in essential services in the 
strict sense of the term (that is, services the interruption of which would endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population).36 The ILO has found that 
the following services on Colombia's list are not essential: civil servants not exercising 
authority of the state, transportation, mining (salt) and oil. Some, but not all, work in 
telecommunications, hospitals and sanitation may be properly classified as essential. 
Electricity and water supply services generally are considered essential. 
3. The possibility of dismissing trade union officers who have intervened or 
participated in an unlawful strike, even where the unlawfulness of the strike rests on 
requirements which are contrary to the principles of freedom of association.37 The 
Committee on Freedom of Association once again urged Colombia to change this 
provision of its labor law in ILO Report No. 343, Case No. 2355 (Colombia) 2007, 
concerning mass dismissals after the 2004 strike at ECOPETROL. 
32
 See, ILO CEACR, Individual Observations, Convention 87, Colombia (2006), supra n. 6. 
3
 Art. 417: "All unions have, without limitation, the ability to join or align themselves in local, regional, 
national, professional or industrial federations, and these into confederations. The federations and 
confederations have the right of own legal form and the same attributions of unions, except for the 
declaration of a strike, that is incumbent on, when the law authorizes it, the respective unions or groups of 
directly or indirectly interested workers." 
34
 Digest of Decisions, \ 525. 
35
 See, Art. 450(l)(a): "The collective suspension of work is illegal in any one of the following cases: a) 
when it is a public service." Art. 430 of the Labor Code defines public service as: those that work in any 
branch of the public service, companies that provide transportation by land, sea or air, electricity, 
telecommunications, all health establishments such as hospitals or clinics, social service establishments, all 
services related to hygiene and cleanliness of the population, the exploitation, processing and distribution of 
salt, the exploitation, refining, transport and distribution of oil (when they are used for the fuel supply of the 
country). 
36
 Digest of Decisions, 1 576. 
See Art. 450(2): "The suspension of work having been declared illegal, the employer is free to dismiss 
for this reason those who have taken part in it, and with respect to workers protected by the law, the 
dismissal will not require judicial qualification." 
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4. The authority of the Minister of Labor to refer a dispute to mandatory arbitration 
when a strike exceeds a certain period.38 The ILO has stated that "a system of compulsory 
arbitration through the labor authorities, if a dispute is not settled by other means, can 
result in a considerable restriction of the right of workers' organizations to organize their 
activities and may even involve an absolute prohibition of strikes, contrary to the 
principles of freedom of association."39 
5. The ability of the Ministry of Social Protection to determine the legality of a 
strike.40 The ILO has stated that, "Responsibility for declaring a strike illegal should not 
lie with the government, but with an independent body which has the confidence of the 
parties involved."41 
II. Enforcement and Application of the Labor Laws 
In practice, only a relatively small fraction of the economically active population is able 
to organize or join a union and bargain collectively. Of the roughly 18 million 
economically active people in the country, about 8 million receive some kind of salary. 
Of them, roughly 3.9 million have a formal labor contract (rather than a civil, commercial 
or other non-labor contract). And of them, about 2.3 million workers have temporary 
contracts, with only 1.6 million having full-time, indefinite contracts. Thus, in practice, 
only 1.6 million workers actually can join a union. However, the majority of these are 
public employees who, though unionized, cannot bargain over working conditions with 
their employer.42 Further, union density has also declined to a low of 4.6% in 2005, and 
the number of workers covered under new collective bargaining agreements has dropped 
to a fraction of its previous number, falling from 260,000 to 60,000 in the past 10 years.43 
In its report, the government touts the recognition of several new unions within the past 
five years. However, while new unions may have been formed, reports by the national 
union centers and by workers attempting to form new unions make clear that numerous 
obstacles to registration remain. The AFL-CIO has identified several cases in which 
unions either were refused recognition by the Ministry of Social Protection on spurious 
grounds or had their initial union registrations revoked at the request of employers that 
opposed the presence of unionized workers in their workplaces. 
For example, workers from around the country formed the National Union of 
Communications Workers, SINTRAC, on Sept. 1, 2006. The assembly was conducted 
and complied with all legal requirements necessary to form an industrial union. The 
See Art 448(4): "When a strike extends beyond sixty (60) calendar days, without the parties finding a 
solution to the conflict that gave rise to the strike, the Ministry of Social Protection will be able to order that 
dispute is put to the decision of an Arbitration Tribunal, in which case the workers will have the obligation 
to resume work within a maximum term of three (3) working days." 
39
 Digest of Decisions, H 568. 
40
 See Article 451(1): "The illegality of a suspension of work will be declared by the Ministry of the Labor." 
" Digest of Decisions, \ 628. 
12
 Interview with Ricardo Bonilla, economist, Center for Development Research, National University. 
43
 Los Derechos Laborales y las Libertades Sindicales en Colombia, pp. 82, 76 (citing data from the 
National Administrative Department for Statistics and the Ministry of Social Protection). 
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paperwork was filed with the Labor Inspectorate in Armenia, Quindio, and was approved 
and "inscribed" under Resolution No. 343 on Dec. 5, 2006. However, one of the 
employers objected to the union's registration, arguing that the founding members were 
not in fact at the founding assembly and thus could not have signed the necessary 
documents. The union provided evidence proving the presence of all the founding 
members at the assembly. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Social Protection decided to 
revoke the approval. To avoid lengthy litigation, the founders of the union held another 
assembly (at their expense) and turned in yet another set of forms to another inspectorate 
in mid-2007. The inspectorate has taken no action, resulting in the de facto registration of 
the union, now called SNTC, after a year's delay. 
The problems are not limited to registration. Trade unions have filed numerous cases 
with the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association, which, upon review, often has 
criticized the government for its failure to adopt laws consistent with the conventions it 
has ratified and/or to effectively enforce domestic and international labor laws. The cases 
below are among the most recent cases, but by no means represent the sum of all cases 
filed. In each, the ILO found that Colombia violated national and/or international labor 
law and urged the government to take the steps necessary to remedy the violations. 
/. Report No. 348, Case No. 2355 (2007). For the fourth time, the ILO issued 
recommendations related to the 2004 strike at ECOPETROL, the state oil company. In 
the most recent review, the ILO once again stated that the strike could not have been 
declared illegal on substantive and procedural grounds, that the government should 
respect the May 26 order of the arbitral tribunal regarding the reinstatement of the 
workers, that the company should desist from firing workers for having participated in the 
strike and to rehire those who have been fired once again and to refrain from blacklisting 
workers who participated in the strike. The government has yet to comply with these 
recommendations. 
2. Report No. 346, Case(s) No(s). 2469 (2007): In this case, the union alleged the 
government: (1) refused to grant the right of collective bargaining to the workers of the 
former Social Security Institute (ISS), which was split into seven state social companies; 
(2) did not recognize the collective agreement in force: (3) limited trade union leave to 20 
hours per month by executive decree; (4) initiated disciplinary proceedings against three 
trade union officials for using that leave; and (5) failed to conduct collective bargaining 
with the trade unions regarding the adoption regulatory decrees that violate the collective 
agreement. 
Upon review of the facts, the ILO urged the government to: (1) take the necessary 
measures to ensure that, in consultation with the trade unions concerned, the national 
legislation is amended so public employees in question can enjoy the right to collective 
bargaining; (2) assure respect for acquired rights as established in the collective 
agreement in force at the ISS and applied at the State Social Company; (3) review 
Circular No. 0005 of 2005 regarding hours of leave for trade union activity, after 
consultations with the trade union organizations concerned, to obtain a solution 
satisfactory to the parties; (4) ensure the disciplinary measures are withdrawn against the 
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union officials for using leave and that adequate compensation is paid to them for any 
damage caused; and (5) take the necessary measures to ensure the collective agreement is 
duly applied. 
3. Report No. 344, Case(s) No(s). 2434 (2007): The ILO here found that: (1) the provision 
of the pension reform law that nullifies existing pension provisions of collective 
agreements violates the right to bargain collectively; (2) the government should hold 
consultations with the unions on retirement and pension issues to reach a negotiated 
solution; and (3) the government should immediately begin to bargain with the public-
sector union SINTRAPROAN. 
4. Report No. 344, Case(s) No(s). 2481 (2007): Here, soccer players filed a complaint 
alleging that the Colombian Football Federation and the Colombian Football Major 
League refused to bargain collectively with the players' association and have threatened 
not to employ players who are association members or who exercise their trade union 
rights. The ILO found that: (1) the soccer team owners' association improperly refused to 
bargain collectively with the players' association; (2) negotiations should resume; and (3) 
an investigation should be undertaken to determine whether there was pressure, threats of 
dismissal and other acts of discrimination directed at workers because of their decision to 
strike, and if so, to punish those responsible. 
5. Report No. 340, Case No. 2424 (2006): In 2000-2001, the government undertook 
several collective dismissals of workers (all of whom belonged to the union) during the 
restructuring and eventual liquidation of Banco Cafetero S.A. The restructuring process 
was implemented without consultations with the trade unions, in contravention of the 
collective agreement in force, which provided for tenure for workers with 10 or more 
years of service. After the liquidation of the company, the dismissed workers then were 
hired under contract by the new bank GRANBANCO S.A., but that under the terms of 
their contracts of employment they cannot form or join a union. 
The ILO reviewed the complaint and urged the government to: (1) ensure the collective 
agreement continues to be applied to workers of BANCAFE while it undergoes 
liquidation, in accordance with the principle that the closing of an enterprise should not in 
itself result in the extinction of the obligations resulting from the collective agreement; 
(2) investigate whether the dismissals that occurred during the process of liquidation were 
motivated by anti-union considerations; and (3) take the necessary steps to guarantee that 
workers dismissed from BANCAFE who now are working for GRANBANCO enjoy the 
right to form a union and bargain collectively. 
15 
SOCIAL DIALOGUE 
Lack of Respect for ILO 
The government of Colombia asserts that it has committed itself to upholding worker 
rights as defined by the ILO. However, the ILO's Committee of Experts has found that 
several provisions of the labor code conflict with core labor standards. Further, the ILO's 
Committee on Freedom of Association has found numerous times that Colombia violates 
its own laws and/or international standards. In some cases, the government has ignored 
multiple resolutions on the same case. The failure to respect the ILO's recommendations, 
which are the product of a tripartite process including workers, government and 
employers, does not reflect well on Colombia's commitment to engaging in and 
respecting the outcomes of social dialogue. 
The Tripartite Agreement 
The international labor community hailed the establishment of the ILO Office in 
Colombia as an important step toward greater respect for labor rights in the country. 
However, we have serious concerns about the lack of political support for the office, 
which impedes the functioning of the office and the dedicated but small staff working 
there. The technical cooperation identified in the Tripartite Accord, by which the ILO 
office was established, has been interpreted by the government to include only workshops 
and seminars. It allows for no verification or involvement of the office in protection of 
labor rights, even though the scope of the accord explicitly lists the promotion and 
defense of fundamental labor rights as integral to the mission. Further, the office consists 
of only one representative and one secretary. No technical or legal support is provided. 
Although an agreement establishing the ILO Office in Colombia was signed in mid-2006, 
only one of the four technical cooperation projects to be undertaken by the ILO Office, on 
social dialogue and fundamental rights, has been fully funded and commenced on Nov. 
28, 2007.45 The long-delayed funding is only sufficient for the payment of one 
experienced project coordinator. 
Finally, the mandate of the ILO Office expires in October 2008. It is essential that the 
mandate of the office be extended if it is to have any long-term impact in the country. 
Dialogue Mechanisms 
Colombian authorities assert that the government has opened and maintained several 
The Tripartite Agreement and Mandate are available online at: www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
standards/relm/gb/docs/gb297/pdf/tc-5-2.pdf. 
45
 The four projects are: I) Strengthening Social Dialogue and Fundamental Rights—Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining in Colombia; 2) Generation of Employment for Vulnerable 
Populations in Colombia: Youth, Displaced and Demobilized; 3) Generation of Employment for Poor 
Women through Entrepreneurial Strengthening With a Focus on Gender and Local Development; and 4) 
Program for Building Capacity for Local Economic Development—PRODEL. 
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dialogue mechanisms with the unions since 2003. Among them are the Commission for 
Dealing with Conflicts, National Commission on Wage and Labor Policy and the Inter-
Institutional Commission for Human Rights. While these mechanisms do exist, it is 
untrue that they have been functioning since 2003. Indeed, some of these commissions 
seem to have been reactivated only recently and with limited scope and few demonstrable 
results in terms of increased labor rights protections or compliance. 
The Commission for Dealing with Conflicts: The Ministry of Social Protection has 
acknowledged that, while this commission was formed years ago, it only began to 
function in mid-2007. Unions are concerned that the government's commitment to the 
commission, which sprang to life only in response to external criticism, may be short-
lived. 
The purpose of the commission is to resolve cases that already have been presented to the 
ILO in Geneva, or new claims that could be brought to the ILO. The ILO Office in 
Colombia already has referred several new cases to this commission. However, for a case 
to be taken up by the commission, all parties involved must agree to it—which is often 
difficult to achieve when parties are in dispute. The fact that the case remains unresolved 
despite clear ILO recommendations is not considered sufficient justification for the 
commission to hear the case. Moreover, the commission is not set up to act upon the ILO 
recommendations, but rather to broker a settlement between the parties, which may result 
in outcomes that afford workers less than they are entitled to if international labor law 
were to be applied. 
Commission on Wage and Labor Policy: The Ministry of Social Protection also 
acknowledged that while the commission was formed years ago, it only began to function 
in 2007. Unions state that the commission has been functioning in the past few months. 
The commission is beginning to work on drafting new legislation to permit collective 
bargaining in the public sector. Unions are cautiously optimistic, but note that there are 
many challenges. 
Inter-Institutional Commission on Human Rights: This commission is established to 
follow the prosecution of crimes against trade unionists and to review the protection 
program. The commission was created by Decree 1413 in 1997. However, it was largely 
dormant until January 2003. A round of meetings was conducted over the year, but with 
no substantial changes resulting from the process it again fell dormant with only sporadic 
activity. The commission was again revived in mid-2007, with the government 
scheduling a series of meetings with local unions around the country. The government 
also has invited federal prosecutors to look at past crimes that were reported by family 
members but are not in the archives of the Office of the Attorney General. The unions are 
participating in the meetings but are reserving judgment about the efficacy of the 
commission given the continued violence and impunity. 
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Government Stigmatization of Unionists 
One factor that contributes to ongoing violence against trade unionists is stigmatization of 
trade unionists as linked to guerrillas. Government officials have contributed to this 
stigmatization. President Uribe stated in May that one of the trade unionists was killed 
this year because he was a "terrorist."46 In 2004, Vice President Francisco Santos, upon 
receiving news of the murder of three trade union leaders in Arauca, stated publicly that 
the unionists were ELN guerrillas killed in combat. A subsequent investigation found that 
soldiers from the Reveiz Pizarro Mechanized Group of the 18th Brigade of the 
Colombian Army executed the unionists, who had no link with any illegal armed group. 
Years of similar accusations by government officials leveled against unionists, human 
rights defenders and journalists not only damage the relationship between the state and 
civil society, but also put people at risk of persecution. 
'"We will not accept Colombia being given the pariah treatment in the United States' says Uribe," El 
Tiempo, May 19,2007. 
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Annex 1 
LAS AGUILAS NEGRAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA 
VECINO USTED QUE NO TIENE CONCIENCIA MALPARIDO TRIPLEHtJUEPUTA 
GUERRILLERO TE DIJIMOS QUE SALIERAS DE AQUI DE BARRANCA Y NO 
LO HICISTES, VOLANDO EN HELICOPTERTO TE SALVASTES COMO UN COBARDE 
TU CRES EN TI QUE TE VAS A SALVAR MALPARIDO HACIENDO DENUNCIAS 
PENDEJAS REPETIDAS VECES,CREES QUE TE VAS A SALVAR DE LO QUE TENEMOS 
PLANEADO PARA Tl QUE YA ES UN HECHO MARICON, SIGUE JUGANDO SIGUE 
JUGANDO PARA QUh POR DONDE TE VAN A SALIR LAS COSAS GUERRILLERO, 
NO . I.USO MALPARIDO HIJUEPUTA, NO TE QUEREMOS NI EN BARRANCA, NI 
EM CAKTAC.- . :RO LUGAR DEI, . PORIO NACIONAL HAS LA PRUEBA 
Y TE VAMOS A T1RAR AL PISO, YA TENEMOS UBICADOS Y MARCADO A TU 
FAMILIA Y A TI EM BOGOTA. 
TE ACUERDAS MALPARIDO QUE AQUI EN BARRANCA TE SALVASTES EN LA CRA. 
22 RACE UNOS 25 DIAS APROXIMADAMENTE TU SABES QUE RECORRIDO 
HICIESTES Y CONQUIEN TE ENCONTRASTES ESE DIA, EN TUS REUNIONES CLANDES 
TINAS TENEMOS FOTOS,VIDEOS,GRABACIONES Y TUS IDAS AL VECINO PAIS TU 
SABES ESTO DE QUE SE TRATA, ESTAS ATRAPADO Y CONFIADO VUELVES A INCUM 
PLIR NUESTRA ORDEN YA SABES QUE ESTAS AVISADO QUE ERES OBJETIVO MILITAP 
OKSF TEHB8 LAMENTOS TE ADVERTIMOS CON TIEMPO MALPARIDO TODO PASA 
Y SE OLVIDA COMO TU CAMARADA AURI SARA MARRUGO, TODOS TUS GUERRILLEROS 
, K) VERAS TRIPLEHIJUEPUTA TE VAS A IR AL HUECO Y ADVIERTELES A 
TUS CAMARA0AS QUE NO FASTIDIEN CON SUS RIDICULAS INTERVENCIONES 1 TODAS 
MES SIN BASE, TODO ESO SE VA ACABAR, YA TU ORDEN ESTA 
\ NQSOTROS TF.NEMOS EL PODER y LOGRAREMOS NUESTRO OBJETIVO 
TRIUNFAREMOS. 
riEMBRE 19 DE 2 
COMANOANTE ZONA 
LAS AGUILAS NEGRAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA 
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Translation: 
Neighbor, you who are not aware son of a b — guerrilla we told you to leave here from 
Barranca[bermeja] and you did not do it, flying in a helicopter you were saved like a 
coward you believe that you are going to save yourself son of a b — by making repeated 
dumb-ass denunciations, you think that you are going to save yourself from what we have 
planed for you, which is already a fact son of a b — , keep playing, keep playing so that 
you see where things are going to be left with you guerrilla, you are not a fool you son of 
a b — , we do not want you in Barranca, nor in Cartagena, nor in any other place in the 
nation, have the proof and we are going to you to shoot you to the ground, we have 
already located and marked you and your family in Bogota. 
You remember son of a b — that here in Barranca you were saved on 22" Ave about 25 
days ago you know what route you took and with whom you met that day, in your 
clandestine meetings, we have photos, video, recordings and your trip to the neighboring 
country you know what this is about, you are caught and trusted that you will not follow 
our order, you know that you are advised that you are a military target, after come the 
laments, we warn you that with time, you son of a b — , everything passes and is 
forgotten, like your comrade Aury Sara Marrugo, all your dead guerrillas, your will see 
son of a b — that you are going to the grave and warn your comrades that they don't 
annoy us with their ridiculous speeches and all those organizations without a base, all thai 
is going to end, your order is ready we have the power and now we will obtain our 
objective, we will prevail. 
September 19,2007 
Zone Commander 
United Black Eagles of Colombia 
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